Pohl Inc. of America v. Ron Webelhuth, Bret Miller, Dennis Miller, Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Pohl Inc. of America v. Ron Webelhuth, Bret Miller,
Dennis Miller, Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc. :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert F. Babcock, Cody W. Wilson, Stephen M. Cockriel; Babcock, Scott and Babcock; attorneys
for appellees.
David W. Scofield, Ronald F. Price; Peters, Scofield and Price; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Pohl Inc. of America v. Ron Webelhuth, Bret Miller, Dennis Miller, Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc., No. 20060409
(Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6485
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
POHL INC. OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RON WEBELHUTH; BRET MILLER; 
DENNIS MILLER; INDUSTRIAL 
SHEET METAL ERECTORS, INC.; 
AND JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
DOCKET NO. 20060409-CA 
Third District Court 
Case No. 050908318 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, SIGNED ON APRIL 3, 3006 AND 
ENTERED ON APRIL 4, 2006 
David W. Scofield (USB No. 4140) 
Ronald F. Price (USB No. 5535) 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile (801) 322-2003 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
Steven M. Cockriel (Pro Hac Vice) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile (801) 531-7060 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
l t r FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE coum 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
POHL INC. OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
\ /c 
Vo. 
RON WEBELHUTH; BRET MILLER; 
DENNIS MILLER; INDUSTRIAL 
SHEET METAL ERECTORS, INC.; 
AND JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
DOCKET NO. 20060409-CA 
Third District Court 
Case No. 050908318 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, SIGNED ON APRIL 3, 3006 AND 
ENTERED ON APRIL 4, 2006 
David W. Scofield (USB No. 4140) 
Ronald F. Price (USB No. 5535) 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile (801) 322-2003 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Robert F. Babcock (USB No. 0158) 
Cody W. Wilson (USB No. 9839) 
Steven M. Cockriel (Pro Hac Vice) 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK 
Washington Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-7000 
Facsimile (801) 531-7060 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction iii 
Standard of Review iii 
Determinative Statutory Provisions iii 
Statement v 
I. Nature of Case v 
II. Course of Proceedings Below vi 
III. Disposition by Trial Court vii 
Statement of Facts vii 
Summary of Argument xvi 
Argument 1 
I. Defendants did not cause injury within the meaning of Utah's long-
arm statute 1 
II. Defendants did not transact business within the State of Utah 3 
III. Even if the Defendants were found to have transacted business in 
the State of Utah, since Pohl's claims are unrelated to the acts 
constituting the transaction of business, there is no basis for 
asserting long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendants 4 
IV. Pohl may not rely upon the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction 
because no acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were performed in 
Utah 6 
V. Due process precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over any 
of the Defendants 7 
Conclusion 9 
Certificate of Service 10 
9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Page 
Blue Chip IR Group, LTC. V. Furth, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56510, *8 
(D. Utah 2006) 2 
Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1980) 2 
Brown v. United States, 1993 WL 643364, *7 (D. Utah 1993) 2 
Envirotech Pumpsystems v. Sterling Fluid Sys. AG, 
200 US. Dist. LEXIS 16942, *19 (D. Utah 2000) 1 
Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 
883 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D. Utah 1995) 1,2 
Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boat & Motors, Inc., 
27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (Utah 1972) 2 
Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. v. Teton Builders, 
205 UT 4, 106 P.3d 719, 726 (2005) 4 
MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, 96 P.3d 927, 931 (2004) 7 
Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 
(D. Utah 1998) 1 
ProAcess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270,1276 
(10th Cir. 2005) 4 
STV Intern. Marketing v. Cannondale, 750 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 
(D. Utah 1990) 2 
Textorv. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 
711 F.2d1387, 1392 (7th Cir. 1983) 6 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-30) »' 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23 iii,3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 iv,1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26 iv,4 
ii 
JURISDICTION 
the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-129(1 )(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), this matter was assigned to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, by Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated May 3, 2006, 
and effective May 23, 2006. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Where a pretrial jurisdiction decision has been made on documentary 
evidence only, an appeal from that decision presents only legal questions that 
are reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach., 838 
P.2d 1120,1121 (Utah 1992) (citing Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic & 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23. 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Definitions. As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, 
association or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of 
a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect 
persons or businesses within the state of Utah. 
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II. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24. 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting person to 
jurisdiction. Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not 
a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of 
the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising 
out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this 
state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding the subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in 
this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a mere 
omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had no control; 
or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives rise 
to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine the paternity for the 
purpose of establishing responsibility for child support. 
III. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-26. 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Only claims arising from 
enumerated acts may be asserted. Only claims arising from acts enumerated 
herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction 
over him is based upon this act. 
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STATEMENT 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case is about a contractual dispute between Pohl Inc. of America 
("Pohl") and T.A.B. Company, Inc. ("TAB") involving two issues: (1) did Pohl 
have a contractual obligation to supply its metal panels to TAB in accordance 
with the Project schedule; and (2) was Pohl entitled to additional time to complete 
the panels due to TAB'S failure to provide necessary field measurements for 
fabrication of the metal panels. In the prior action between TAB and Pohl, both 
parties asserted claims for breach of contract against each other. However, 
because TAB determined that it could no longer afford to litigate the prior dispute 
between TAB and Pohl in the State of Utah - as TAB had agreed to do in the 
Credit Application it signed for Pohl - and because Pohl learned that TAB could 
not afford to pay a Judgment if Pohl prevailed in the lawsuit, TAB and Pohl 
settled their dispute. 
The current litigation is simply an attempt by Pohl to extort monies from 
foreign defendants who also can not afford to litigate in Utah. As Pohl states in 
its Brief, its products are used throughout the country. Pohl knew it was 
supplying its materials for use on a public works project in Missouri and sent two 
representatives to the Project site during the Project. Pohl can easily travel to 
the State of Missouri to pursue these claims - where jurisdiction against these 
defendants is proper. 
Just as predicted by Occam's Razor1, the actual facts are much simpler 
and less sinister than the fairy tale authored by Pohl's counsel. TAB, a small, 
woman-owned, minority firm contracted with KCI Construction Company ("KCI"), 
the general contractor on the Project, to supply and install the metal panel 
system on the Project in accordance with the Project schedule. TAB then issued 
a Purchase Order to Pohl to supply the metal panel system. 
When efforts failed to get the metal panel system on site in time to meet 
with Project schedule, KCI terminated TAB'S contract. TAB, in turn, terminated 
Pohl's contract. Obviously and prudently, before terminating TAB'S contract, KCI 
had performed an investigation into whether it was possible to obtain an 
acceptable metal panel system from an alternate source in a shorter time frame 
(thereby minimizing the delay to the Project) than TAB could deliver the Pohl-
manufactured panels. No conspiracy, no tortious interference with contract; just 
mitigation of damages. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Defendants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the underlying case for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction. 
1
 All things being equal, the simplest explanation tends to be the best one. 
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III. DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT. 
6y Order dated April 3, 2006, the trial court granted Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 27, 2000, KCI entered into a contract with the Curators of 
the University of Missouri to construct the new Performing Arts Center at the 
University of Missouri - St. Louis campus in St. Louis County, Missouri. This 
contract was for a public works project governed by the laws of the State of 
Missouri. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 2, R. 43-44. 
2. Defendant Ronald F. Webelhuth ("Webelhuth") was KCI's project 
manager for the Performing Arts Center project (the "Project"). Webelhuth 
Affidavit 1J 3, R. 43-44. 
3. All of Webelhuths' actions in connection with the Project were done 
exclusively within the scope of his employment with KCI. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 
4, R. 43-44. 
4. TAB entered into a subcontract with KCI to furnish and install the 
roofing, flashing, sheet metal, smoke vents, access hatches, and the metal panel 
system for the Project. Webelhuth Affidavit If 5, R. 44; Webelhuth Deposition at 
8:16-19, R. 191. 
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5. The specifications for the Project required that Pohl's metal paneling 
system - or an approved equal - be installed on the Project. Webelhuth 
Deposition at 8:24-25; 9:1-2, R. 191-192. 
6. The subcontract between KCI and TAB authorized KCI to give TAB 
notice of KCI's intent to terminate the subcontract on two days notice in the event 
of a default in performance by TAB; and in such a case, KCI could then hire 
another person or firm to complete the remaining work and TAB would be liable 
for any excess completion costs. Webelhuth Deposition at 40:5-14, R. 213. 
7. TAB subcontracted the installation of the Project's metal panel 
system to Industrial Sheet Metal Erectors, Inc. ("ISME"). Vickers Affidavit U 7, R. 
48; B. Miller Affidavit U 4, R. 61. 
8. Bret Miller is ISME's Vice President; and he ran the Project for 
ISME. B. Miller Affidavit H 5, R. 61. 
9. Bret Miller's father, Dennis Miller, is the President of ISME, but he 
had no involvement in the Project. B. Miller Affidavit U 9, R. 61; D. Miller Affidavit 
117, R. 75. 
10. TAB submitted a purchase order dated April 28, 2000 to Pohl for the 
metal panel system for the Project. Vickers Affidavit U 9, R. 48; Exhibit "B" to the 
Complaint, R. 11. 
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11. TAB requested Bret Miller of ISME to provide field dimensions and 
scheduling information directly to Pohl for Pohl's use in fabricating the metal 
panels for the Project. Bret Miller's communications with Pohl were by phone, 
fax or letter. Pohl also had two representatives visit the Project site during 
construction. B. Miller Affidavit fl 12, R. 61. 
12. KCI submitted the overall Project schedule to TAB in May 2000. 
Exhibit "G" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369. 
13. In a letter dated February 10, 2003 from KCI (written by Webelhuth 
as Project Manager) to TAB, KCI advised TAB that, based upon information 
previously provided and the actual dates of completion of other work on the 
Project, all of the metal panel system should have been delivered to the Project 
by no later than February 6, 2003. KCI's letter also reminded TAB that none of 
the previous commitments for delivery of the Pohl panels had been met. KCI's 
letter warned TAB of the severe consequences of late delivery of the metal 
panels to the Project. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369. 
14. KCI's February 10, 2003 letter was immediately sent to Pohl by 
ISME by cover letter dated February 10, 2003. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction, R. 366-369. 
15. Pohl's counsel (who is Pohl's appellate counsel in this case) wrote a 
letter dated February 12, 2003 to ISME. This letter acknowledged receipt of 
ISME's February 10, 2003 letter, and took exception to the information conveyed. 
Pohl's counsel advised that: "[i]ndeed, Pohl has no existing contract, with any 
company, that requires it to provide any product or service of any kind, on any 
date." The letter concludes by stating that the Pohl panels would only be 
delivered on a C.O.D. basis, that Pohl was only committed to ship two parts of 
the overall order for Pohl panels, and that TAB should contact Pohl's counsel "if it 
desires Pohl to proceed." Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 371-373. 
16. ISME faxed a copy of Pohl's counsel's February 12, 2003 letter to 
KCI's Webelhuth on February 12, 2003. Exhibit "G" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 
371-373. 
17. When Pohl's metal panels did not arrive on the Project site the first 
week of February, 2003, Webelhuth had discussions with Bret Miller about the 
need to get the metal panels to the site in order to get the Project complete. 
Webelhuth Deposition at 32:4-25; 33:1-7, R. 205-206. 
18. At that time, Bret Miller advised Webelhuth that there was an 
alternative panel material that ISME could obtain, manufacture and install in 
order to complete the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at 30:21-25; 31:1-13, R. 
203-204. 
19. Webelhuth then approached the Project owner and architect about 
using a different panel system on the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at 33:1-10, 
R. 206. 
20. Webelhuth advised the owner and architect of the problems that 
were being experienced in getting the Pohl panels, and that there was another 
system that could be used to complete the Project. Webelhuth Deposition at 
36:5-10, R. 209. 
21. On February 17, 2003, Webelhuth hand-delivered a letter to TAB 
advising that if the Pohl-manufactured metal panels were not delivered to the 
Project within two days, KCI was terminating TAB'S subcontract. Webelhuth 
Deposition at 25:7-9, R. 198. 
22. TAB, in turn, faxed a letter to Pohl dated February 17, 2003 advising 
Pohl that if the metal panels were not delivered to the Project by February 19, 
2003, TAB would consider the Purchase Order to be null and void. Exhibit "C" to 
the Complaint, R. 12; Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 306-307. 
23. KCI terminated TAB's subcontract with KCI for the Project as a result 
of TAB's inability to supply the required metal panel sections to the project in 
accordance with the project schedule agreed to by TAB. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 
10, R.44. 
24. TAB, in turn, terminated its contract with Pohl for non-performance. 
Vickers Affidavit U 15, R. 49. 
25. As a result of KCI's termination of TAB's subcontract, TAB issued a 
change order to ISME eliminating the installation of the metal panel system from 
ISME's scope of work. Vickers Affidavit H 17, R. 49. 
26. Subsequent to KCI's termination of its subcontract with TAB, KCI 
entered into a subcontract with ISME for ISME to supply the substitute metal 
panels, and to otherwise complete TAB's scope of work. Webelhuth Affidavit H 
11, R. 44-45. 
27. KCI has never entered into a contract with Pohl in relation to the 
Project or otherwise. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 7, R. 44. 
28. Webelhuth spoke in person with two Pohl representatives when they 
visited the Project, i.e., in St. Louis County, Missouri. Other than that on-site 
discussion, Webelhuth's only other discussions with Pohl representatives 
consisted of telephone communications initiated by Pohl. Webelhuth has not 
conducted any business in Utah; has not contracted to supply goods or services 
in Utah; has not caused any injury in Utah; does not own any real estate in Utah; 
has not conducted any activities in Utah which would cause him to reasonably 
anticipate being haled into Utah courts; has not traveled to Utah for any reason 
for the past thirty years; and has never contracted to insure any person, property 
or risk located in Utah. Webelhuth Affidavit fl 8,12-18, R. 44-45. 
29. Dennis Miller played no role on the Project; never visited the 
Project; had no communications of any kind with TAB or KCI with respect to the 
Project; had absolutely no communications of any kind with anyone who is or 
was an employee or representative of Pohl related to this Project; has never 
conducted any business in the State of Utah; has never contracted to supply 
goods or services in the State of Utah; has never caused any injury within the 
State of Utah; has never owned, used or possessed any real estate located in 
the State of Utah; has never conducted any activities within the State of Utah 
which would cause him to reasonably anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts; 
and has never contracted to insure any person, property or risk located within the 
State of Utah. D. Miller Affidavit fl 7-8, 13-18, R. 75-76. 
30. In February 2003, in view of the problems that ISME was 
experiencing on the Project, Dennis Miller wrote a note to his son, Bret Miller, 
advising him to collect the documentation for the Project. B. Miller Deposition at 
103:4-8, R. 307-308; Exhibit "G" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, R. 370. 
31. ISME is a Missouri corporation with offices located in St. Charles, 
Missouri; ISME had no contract with Pohl related to the Project; In 2000, ISME 
purchased $12,064.00 of materials from Pohl and in 2001, ISME purchased 
$36,950.00 of materials from Pohl; both of these purchases were for materials 
used in work for East St. Louis High School in East St. Louis, Illinois; except for 
the 2 small orders with Pohl in 2000 and 2001, ISME has never conducted any 
business with any person or entity in the State of Utah; ISME has never 
contracted to supply goods or services in the State of Utah; ISME has not caused 
any injury within the State of Utah; ISME has never owned, used or possessed 
any real estate located in the State of Utah; ISME have never conducted any 
activities within the State of Utah which would cause ISME to reasonably 
anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts; and ISME have never contracted to 
insure any person, property or risk located within the State of Utah. B. Miller 
Affidavit H 7, 31-35, R. 61-62. 
32. Bret Miller never traveled to Utah in connection with the Project; has 
never conducted any business in the State of Utah; has never contracted to 
supply goods or services in the State of Utah; has never caused any injury within 
the State of Utah; has never owned, used or possessed any real estate located 
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in the State of Utah; has never conducted any activities within the State of Utah 
which would cause him to reasonably anticipate being hailed into Utah Courts; 
and has never contracted to insure any person, property or risk located within the 
State of Utah. B. Miller Affidavit U 13, 23-28, R. 61-63. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
To prove the claims as alleged in its Complaint, Pohl must prove the 
following facts: 
1. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME collectively 
decided that they wanted ISME to supply the metal panel system for the Project; 
2. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME worked together 
to get the Project owner and architect to accept the substitute metal panel 
system to be supplied by ISME; 
3. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced KCI to 
impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon TAB; 
4. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or 
forced TAB to impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon Pohl 
by getting TAB to send its February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl threatening 
termination of Pohl's Purchase Order if the metal panels are not delivered to the 
Project by February 19, 2003; and 
5. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or 
forced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order because Pohl did not deliver its 
metal panels by February 19, 2003. 
Any other alleged communications or contacts with Pohl or the State of 
Utah by Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and/or ISME were not in 
wi 
furtherance of the conspiracy that forms the basis for Pohl's claims - so these 
other contacts are irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction evaluation. See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-26. 
Even if Pohl's allegations were true - and Defendants deny that they are -
for the allegedly conspiracy to make any sense, the motivation for the 
Defendants would have been profit for themselves, not to harm or injure to Pohl. 
Furthermore, while the financial impact of the alleged conspiracy might have 
been felt in Utah, no "injury" occurred in the State of Utah. The Utah courts have 
uniformly held that causing financial injury to a Utah business is not a sufficient 
basis to assert specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. 
All of the alleged actions by the Defendants occurred in the State of 
Missouri. By definition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-23(2), since none of their 
activities occurred "in this state," Defendants did not transact business in the 
State of Utah - even if the actions "affected persons or businesses within the 
State of Utah." See generally Memorandum Decision pp. 3-4. 
Moreover, since Defendants took no action in the State of Utah, and the 
only action that they allegedly took in furtherance of the conspiracy was inducing 
TAB to send a letter to Pohl in Utah. The Defendants do not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with the State of Utah to satisfy due process. 
VA/ii 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS DID NOT CAUSE AN INJURY WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE. 
Pohl first argues that Defendants caused an "injury" within the State of 
Utah for purposes of asserting jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3). 
The sole basis for this claim is that the impact of the alleged conspiracy was felt 
in Utah were Pohl is based. 
While the financial impact may have been felt in the State of Utah - that 
does not mean an "injury" occurred in the State of Utah. If Pohl's position was 
taken to be the correct reading of Utah's Long-Arm Statute, then Utah could 
assert long-arm jurisdiction in every case involving a Utah corporation asserting a 
claim sounding in tort. 
Pohl cites no cases interpreting Utah's long-arm statute in support of 
Pohl's theory, and relies upon cases from other jurisdictions interpreting other 
long-arm statutes. Apparently, Pohl's counsel did not search very hard as 
"causing financial injury to a Utah business 'has been flatly rejected by the Utah 
courts as a basis for exercising specific personal jurisdiction.'" Patriot Sys., Inc. 
v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (D. Utah 1998), citing 
Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D. 
Utah 1995). See also Envirotech Pumpsystems v. Sterling Fluid Sys. AG, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16942, *19 (D. Utah 2000) ("... this court has consistently 
rejected financial injury to a plaintiff resulting from conduct occurring outside of 
Utah as a basis for exercising specific jurisdiction over a defendant."); Blue Chip 
IR Group, LTD. v. Furth, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56510, *8 (D. Utah 2006)("Courts 
have held that jurisdiction cannot be predicated solely upon financial injury 
occurring to a Utah resident. For a court to exercise jurisdiction based solely on 
financial injury 'would lead to the unacceptable proposition that jurisdiction could 
be established anywhere a plaintiff might locate.'" Quoting Burt Drilling, Inc. v. 
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1980)). 
Even more to the point, the court in Harnischfeger Engineers, in effectively 
rejecting that the term "injury" in Utah's long-arm statute can be expansively read 
to include financial injury to a business located in Utah, observed as follows: 
HEI can at best argue that while Uniflo tortiously interfered with and 
defamed HEI in Tennessee, Virginia, and Illinois, Uniflo "caused" a 
financial injury to HEI's business in Utah. Yet this argument has 
been flatly rejected by the Utah courts as a basis for 
exercising specific personal jurisdiction. See e.g., Brown[ v. United 
States], 1993 WL 643364, at *7 [(D. Utah 1993)]("Jurisdiction 
[cannot] be predicated solely upon financial injury occurring to a 
Utah resident.") (citing Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors, 
Inc., 27 Utah 2d 233, 494 P.2d 532, 532 (Utah 1972)); [STV Intern. 
Marketing v.] Cannondale, 750 F. Supp. [1070] at 1075 [(D. Utah. 
1990)]("Loss of profits within a state in which a place of business is 
maintained simply is an insufficient basis on which to find that the 
injury occurred within that state. . . ."). Indeed, acceptance of such 
an argument "would lead to the unacceptable proposition that 
jurisdiction could be established anywhere a plaintiff might locate." 
Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1980) 
(citations omitted). 
883 F. Supp. at 613. 
Defendants simply did not cause an "injury" within the State of Utah under 
Utah's long-arm statute. 
o 
II. DEFENDANTS DID NOT TRANSACT BUSINESS WITHIN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Despite Pohl's efforts to muddle the record, the facts also do not support 
any claim of personal jurisdiction based upon a claim that Defendants 
"transacted business" within the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23(2) provides as follows: 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean 
activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in 
this state which affect persons or businesses within the state of 
Utah, (emphasis added). 
The statute requires at least some activities must occur in the State of 
Utah. Pohl has acknowledged in its brief that all of Defendant's activities were 
conducted in the State of Missouri. As a result, the trial court correctly ruled that: 
"...the only actions or conduct by them [Defendant's] that form the 
basis for Plaintiff's claims were performed exclusively in the State of 
Missouri - with persons or entities located in the State of 
Missouri...the Court can find no nexus between Defendants' 
contacts with Utah and Plaintiffs claims." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 4. 
As Defendants did not conduct any activities in the State of Utah, they 
simply can not have transacted business within the State of Utah for purposes of 
asserting long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendants. 
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III. EVEN IF THE DEFENDANTS WERE FOUND TO HAVE 
TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SINCE 
POHL'S CLAIMS ARE UNRELATED TO THE ACTS 
CONSTITUTING THE TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS, THERE IS 
NO BASIS FOR ASSERTING LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER 
THE DEFENDANTS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-26 provides that only claims arising from acts 
enumerated in Utah's Long-Arm Statute may be asserted against a defendant in 
an action in which jurisdiction is based upon the enumerated acts. This is 
consistent with the requirement imposed by Utah Courts that there must be a 
"nexus" between the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts or contacts. See 
e.g., Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT4,106 
P.3d 719, 726 (2005); ProAcess, Inc. v. Orlux Distribution, Inc., 428 F.3d 1270, 
1276 (10th Cir. 2005). 
Therefore, even if Defendants are found to have "transacted business" in 
the State of Utah within the meaning of said terms, only claims that are based 
upon the acts constituting the transaction of business may be asserted by Pohl in 
this action if jurisdiction is to be proper. 
All three of the claims asserted by Pohl in its Complaint depend upon proof 
of the following facts: 
1. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME collectively 
decided that they wanted ISME to supply the metal panel system for the Project; 
2. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME worked together 
to get the Project owner and architect to accept the substitute metal panel 
system to be supplied by ISME; 
3. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced KCI to 
impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon TAB; 
4. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or 
forced TAB to impose arbitrary and impossible scheduling demands upon Pohl 
by getting TAB to send its February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl threatening 
termination of Pohl's Purchase Order if the metal panels are not delivered to the 
Project by February 19, 2003; and 
5. Ron Webelhuth, Dennis Miller, Bret Miller and ISME induced or 
forced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order because Pohl did not deliver its 
metal panels by February 19, 2003. 
Therefore, even under Pohl's fabricated web of conjecture, the following 
alleged connections with Utah have no bearing on the personal jurisdiction 
analysis: that Defendants knew that Pohl's metal panels were required for use on 
the Project; that Defendants knew that Pohl would be conducting activities in 
Utah; that KCI had an obligation to supply Pohl's metal panels for the Project; 
that ISME solicited a quote from Pohl; that ISME assisted TAB in contracting with 
Pohl; that KCI used Pohl's quote in KCI's quote on the Project; that ISME and 
Bret Miller communicated with Pohl about the production and delivery of the 
metal panels; and that KCI had communications related to Pohl's production and 
delivery of metal panels. 
§ince Pohl's claims as alleged in the Complaint do not arise from these 
actions, these actions - even if construed erroneously to be the transaction of 
business under Utah's Long-Arm Statute - do not support the exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction over the Defendants. As a result, the trial court correctly ruled 
that: 
"...Defendants lack the substantial and continual contacts with Utah 
required for general personal jurisdiction and ... the Court is 
persuaded Defendants also lack the "minimum contacts" required to 
satisfy the due process requirements of specific personal 
jurisdiction." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 4. 
IV. POHL MAY NOT RELY UPON THE CONSPIRACY THEORY OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BECAUSE NO ACTS IN 
FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY WERE PERFORMED IN 
UTAH. 
Quoting from Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 
711 F.2d 1387,1392 (7th cir. 1983), Pohl argues that Dennis Miller is subject to 
personal jurisdiction under the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction: "The 
'conspiracy theory' of personal jurisdiction is based on the 'time honored' notion 
that the acts of [a] conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to 
the other members of the conspiracy." 
However, the Pohl stopped its review of the Textor case too soon. The 
Textor Court went on to clarify: 
To plead successfully facts supporting application of the conspiracy 
theory of jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege both an actionable 
conspiracy and a substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
performed in the forum state. 
711 F.2d. 1392-1393 (emphasis added, citation omitted). Here, Pohl has not 
alleged any acts performed by any Defendant in the State of Utah, so Pohl may 
not rely upon the "conspiracy theory" of jurisdiction. As a result, the trial court 
correctly ruled that: 
"...there is no basis for assertion of the conspiracy theory of 
personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants as there was no 
substantial act in furtherance of the conspiracy performed in the 
forum state." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 4. 
V. DUE PROCESS PRECLUDES THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, 
96 P.3d 927, 931 (2004) provides a nice summary of the principles that must 
guide the Court when examining due process concerns in the personal 
jurisdiction context: 
Courts properly exercise personal jurisdiction only "where the 
contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself 
that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum state." We 
exercise specific personal jurisdiction "only on claims arising out of 
defendant's forum-state activity," and the contact between the 
defendant and the forum state must be such that the defendant 
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Finally, 
"minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and 
substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction 
even if the defendant has purposely engaged in forum activities." 
Thus, "the determination of whether Utah can justify asserting 
"T 
jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balance of fairness to the 
parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction. 
Mere corporate status can never be the basis for jurisdiction; "each 
defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed 
individually." Thus, contacts giving rise to jurisdiction over a 
corporation cannot automatically be attributed to its officers and 
directors; rather, each individual defendant must have sufficient 
contacts. Due process is only satisfied based upon the "quality and 
nature of the activity" for each individual defendant. (Citations 
omitted). 
Defendants believe that any reasonable review of the facts - even as 
distorted and colored by Plaintiff - demonstrates that there is no "fair play and 
substantial justice" in forcing three individuals and one small company (all of 
whom are residents of the State of Missouri) to travel to the State of Utah to 
litigate with a multi-national corporation regarding an alleged "conspiracy" to 
interfere with a contract involving another small Missouri company and a Missouri 
public works construction project. 
Defendants did nothing in the State of Utah. The only activities alleged by 
Pohl that support the claims asserted in its Complaint are: (1) Defendants 
allegedly induced TAB to send the February 17, 2003 letter to Pohl in Utah; and 
(2) Defendants allegedly induced TAB to terminate Pohl's Purchase Order. 
These alleged actions would have been performed by the Defendants in 
Missouri, not Utah. The fact that the impact of these alleged actions was felt in 
Utah is simply not enough to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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